This article examines the political origins of antitrust enforcement in developing countries. I consider how the organization and political influence of business affects governments' commitments to competition policy institutions. The analysis predicts cross-class coalitions with contending regulatory preferences. An alliance of incumbent producers and affiliated labor groups ("insiders") opposes competition policies that threaten its existing rents. A pro-competition coalition of consumers, unorganized workers, and small businesses ("outsider") favors the price and employment effects of effective antitrust enforcement. I argue that governments' commitments to competition policy reflect the congruence of interests among economic insiders and the strength of democratic institutions. I examine the argument using a new dataset measuring the timing of competition policy reforms, as well as governments' commitments to the effectiveness of the competition policy authority. The empirical analysis indicates that democracies are more likely to pursue competition policy reforms. I also find that organized insiders are associated with a slower reform process, and with less effective competition agencies.
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This article examines how the organization and political influence of business affects variation in competition policy institutions in the developing world. The topic is motivated in part by research arguing that industrial organization and patterns of corporate ownership affect productivity, innovation, and, ultimately, economic growth. 1 Moreover, it appears that one of the enduring lessons of the global financial crisis is that regulatory laxity poses huge systemic risks, but that entrenched interests will fight hard to maintain the status quo. 2 Focusing on the domestic politics of competition policy reform, I propose that powerful actors seek to impede the development of competition policy institutions that diminish their rents. Democratic political institutions help determine the influence of competing interests groups over the timing and efficacy of competition policy reforms.
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Recent interest in competition policy in the developing world is driven in part by the failure of the Washington Consensus to produce more equitable economic development. 4 Increasing economic competition from a non-competitive status quo implies a redistribution of wealth from organized incumbent oligopolists ("producers") to diffuse consumers. 9 Effective competition policy enforcement weakens the ability of incumbent producers to capture and maintain rents, benefiting consumers through favorable price effects. The redistribution of rents implies political conflict: incumbent interests will lobby to maintain and expand their rents, while consumers will support greater competition policy enforcement. My analysis looks beyond industry concentration in product markets to examine how labor market considerations shape workers' regulatory preferences. Building on the assumption that workers prefer lower unemployment and higher salaries, I argue that the effects of competition policies on employment and wages help explain workers' attitudes toward antitrust reform.
The introduction of labor market incentives sheds new light on the politics of competition regulation and explains the formation of cross-class alliances with contending preferences. A procompetition coalition consists of consumers, unorganized workers, and small (often informal)
business owners who all favor the effects of competition on lower prices, greater product choice, and lower unemployment. The competing group is a rent-preserving alliance anchored in the interests of concentrated incumbent producers and allied labor, which seeks to maintain anticompetitive rents by opposing competition policy reform. The political cleavage pits outsiders, who favor competition policy reform, against insiders, who oppose it. This divide is distinct from most production-based approaches in the political economy literature, in which social and political divisions are drawn along class (factors of production) or industry lines. POLITICAL SCIENCE 526-539 (2002) .
Variation in competition policy reflects the interests of the winner of this political conflict between outsiders and insiders. When the pro-competition coalition prevails, my analysis predicts that governments commit to effective antitrust oversight by establishing competition policy institutions. When the rent-preserving alliance wins out, no such regulatory institutions emerge.
Competition policy reflects the political weight of the organized interest group (the rent-preserving alliance) relative to the unorganized set of pro-competition forces. I explain that the political power of insiders increases when workers share in the anticompetitive rents. I argue that rigidities in labor markets enable workers to extract a portion of these rents, thus strengthening labor's alliance with concentrated incumbent capital in opposition to regulatory policies that promote entry and competition.
Furthermore, I show that domestic political institutions affect competition policy by allocating political power across the contending coalitions. Specifically, I argue that democratizationcharacterized by an expansion of the franchise and the introduction of electoral competition-leads to policies favored by outsiders. As a result, democracy increases the likelihood of effective competition policy reform.
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The empirical portion of the paper examines the political correlates of competition policy using cross-national data. 11 I conduct two independent tests of the theory using an original dataset on competition policy institutions that records reforms in nearly every developing country from 1975 to 2007. First, examine the determinants of antitrust policy adoption around the world, I endogenize 10 See Parakkal, supra note 7. 11 The analysis of the determinants of policy contrasts with related research, which generally employs economic outcomes as the dependent variable. The important contribution by Rogowski and Kayser, supra note 9, for instance, makes inferences about the effect of institutions on the relative strength of producers by measuring the correlation between electoral institutions and prices. But prices are far down the causal chain: the effect of politics on prices presumably operates through a regulatory policy channel.
the date of reform using hazard models. The estimates measure how interest groups and democracy affect the speed with which countries pass competition policy reforms. Second, I create an original index that gauges governments' commitments to the effectiveness of their competition agencies at the end of the study period. The index captures the de jure independence of the antitrust agency, as well as the de facto enforcement of competition policy. This second set of models estimates the relationship between my political explanatory variables and governments' commitments to the effectiveness of antitrust institutions.
The main results are as follows. Consistent with the theory, anticompetitive interest groups slow the reform process and weaken commitment to a robust regulatory regime. I also find evidence that political institutions mediate the strength of the contending groups. As predicted, democracy speeds regulatory reform and strengthens commitment to antitrust effectiveness. However, democracy opens the door to competition among the contending groups, and I find that the marginal influence of insiders on competition policy is strongest in more democratic settings. The results demonstrate that powerful incumbent interests and domestic political institutions shape the emergence and effectiveness of competition policy reforms.
The Politics of Competition Policy Reform
Under a neoclassical framework, economic competition-characterized by the entry of new firms into product markets-is welfare enhancing since it eliminates producer rents, leading to lower prices and lower unemployment. I define domestic competition policy as the set of laws and institutions that affects market contestability, or the ability of new firms to enter the market.
An encompassing view of competition policy includes at least three sets of institutions. First, competition policy includes the regulations that raise the costs of entering the market. 17 This assumption follows from a standard neoclassical framework. As previously noted, alternative approaches do not necessarily view economic competition as consumer welfare enhancing. 18 An important point of emphasis is that producers need not be monopolists in the strict sense in order to have market power: barriers to competition may bestow market power on more than one firm, enabling each to set prices above marginal cost.
A common approach in the literature suggests that consumers represent a monolithic counterweight to incumbent producers. According to this approach, a reduction of market powergreater product market competition-uniformly favors consumers by lowering prices. Compared to a status quo in which producers can engage in anticompetitive practices without consequences, much of the extant literature implies that all consumers should support greater competition policy enforcement.
My extension looks beyond product markets to consider consumers' alternative role as workers within labor markets. Building on the assumption that workers prefer lower unemployment and higher salaries, I argue that the effects of competition policies on employment and wages help determine workers' attitudes toward competition policy reform. Specifically, the labor market implications of antitrust enforcement divide workers into two groups with contending preferences over reform.
Labor insiders, or the subset of workers that shares in anticompetitive rents, align with incumbent capital in opposition to competition policy reform. The formation of a rent-preserving alliance between labor and capital requires that labor extract a portion of incumbent firms' anticompetitive rents. That is, where workers share in the spoils of market power, their interests will coincide with those of incumbent producers in opposition to competition policy that promotes new firm entry and economic competition. I argue below that workers' ability to extract rents is determined in part by rigidities in labor markets that increase the costs of firing workers.
Labor outsiders, on the other hand, are the much larger subset of labor that includes unemployed, non-union, or informal sector workers. 19 Employment and wage considerations cause labor outsiders to favor competition policy that promotes new firm entry and erodes market power.
The principle reason that labor outsiders favor a robust competition policy is that product market competition increases employment growth. 20 The intuition is that firms with market power restrict output in order to increase price, resulting in their monopoly rents. The reduction in output lowers the demand for labor, which reduces employment. Empirical research confirms that increased product market competition can reduce unemployment, 21 informing the argument that labor outsiders anchor a pro-competition coalition in favor of competition policy enforcement. is a recent phenomenon, it would be unlikely to significantly impact market structure in the short run.
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The probability of antitrust reform decreases with economic concentration, because concentrated business represents a powerful lobby against reforms designed to increase competition. The argument follows from the strong theoretical and empirical result that firms in concentrated markets will have distinct lobbying advantages compared to diffuse pro-competition interests. 25 Concentrated markets are by definition populated by a small number of firms, implying that the per-firm payoff of maintaining status quo rents is relatively high. As a result, firms in concentrated markets will oppose regulatory reforms that threaten to increase market competition.
MICHAEL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES (2003)
. 24 To address concerns about the potential endogeneity of economic concentration in the empirical portion of the paper, all of my models capture the economies of scale determinants of concentration, which Mitton shows alone explain half of the variation in concentration across countries. I also control for the degree to which external competition through trade openness may erode concentration, as well as other economic and institutional factors. The second factor that contributes to the political strength of the rent-preserving alliance is labor market institutions. 26 I argue that labor institutions that make worker dismissal particularly costly help shape workers' attitudes toward competition policy because these rigidities give workers greater bargaining power within the firm. In particular, I contend that labor's opposition to reform strengthens with the costs of firing workers: where firing costs are high, workers can credibly threaten firm owners; and a credible threat of noncompliance enables workers to extract a portion of the anticompetitive rents in the form of higher salaries. Consistent with this view, empirical research finds a positive correlation between the market share of a firm and the wages that it pays its employees in countries with relatively inflexible labor market institutions.
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In sum, when workers share anticompetitive rents, these labor insiders align with capital owners in powerful opposition to institutional reforms designed to increase market competition. A testable empirical implication of the argument follows.
Hypothesis 1. All else equal, governments' commitments to effective competition policy reform are weaker in countries with concentrated markets and rigid labor market institutions.
The analysis proceeds to examine how domestic political institutions influence the relative political weight of the contending coalitions, contributing to variation in competition policy. In 26 To gain theoretical tractability, I assume the exogeneity of labor market institutions, which tend to be very sticky over time. Empirical research suggests that these institutions can be explained by their exogenous "legal origin," or the set of legal traditions carried over from colonization. First, an expansion of the franchise should favor outsiders by increasing their share of the winning coalition. A large literature distinguishes between the makeup of winning coalitions across political regimes and informs the argument that outsiders' share of the winning coalition increases as a country moves from autocracy to democracy. In autocracies, leaders maintain power through the support of a coalition that could include any number of groups, but by definition, the minimum winning coalition does not include a majority of citizens. Rather, the minimum winning coalition in autocracies often includes economic elites or "the major producers/investors in the economy". Indeed, in many developing countries, the autocratic coalition consists of industrialists and their labor allies who gained economic power through various development strategies that shielded them from domestic, or more commonly in the Latin American case, external competitors. An expansion of the franchise reduces the proportion of the winning coalition represented by these groups of insiders; by extension, democratization increases the proportion of the minimum winning coalition represented by outsiders. Thus, to the extent that policy reflects the preferences of the winning coalition, democratization should contribute to the development of competition policy institutions.
A second mechanism through which democracy contributes to competition policy reform is electoral competition. The logic emerges from a simple median voter framework, which suggests that the platforms of the two candidates in a competitive election will converge on the preferences of the median voter, 31 or those of the dominant majority. 32 Following the assumption that the procompetition coalition is larger than the rent-preserving alliance, an expansion of the franchise to some approximation of universal suffrage ensures that the median voter is an outsider. Thus, to the extent that democratization increases political competition, it will lead to policies that reflect the preferences of the pro-competition coalition, including competition policy reform and its enforcement. 465-90 (1994) . The deadweight loss from uncompetitive markets accrues to outsiders, who constitute the dominant majority in a democracy.
In sum, I have argued that competition policies reflect the relative political strength of two contending coalitions. Countries will be slower to adopt competition policy reforms where an alliance of concentrated producers and workers shares anticompetitive rents. That is, countries with concentrated markets and rigid labor market institutions will be reluctant to reform, since reform may erode the rents of a large and powerful group of economic insiders. I also expect that governments' commitments to the design and enforcement of competition policy will be weaker where the rent-preserving alliance is strong. Democracy, by contrast, will favor the pro-competition coalition by generating incentives for elected policymakers to pursue policies favored by outsiders.
Democracies will likely reform faster and create more effective regulatory institutions. Using an original dataset of competition policy reform in developing countries, I devote the remainder of the paper to examining these claims.
Empirical Analysis
To test the theory, I construct a new dataset on competition agency reform and enforcement in nearly every developing country. . By contrast, competition agencies were almost non-existent in non-OECD countries prior to 1975, making this sample an ideal natural laboratory in which to explore the effects of interest groups and democracy on regulatory reform. 34 The following countries passed laws establishing competition agencies prior to the study period, 1975 -2007 : Brazil (1962 ), India (1969 ), Pakistan (1970 ), and Chile (1973 . The remaining 151 countries in the sample did so during the study period.
Enforcement Agencies, the Consumer Unity and Trust Society report on competition regimes around the world, 35 and Stefan Voigt's study of the effects of competition agencies on productivity. 36 Supplementary sources include individual countries' competition agency websites.
The unique dataset allows me to conduct two independent tests of the hypotheses. First, to examine the political factors affecting the pace of the reform process, I endogenize the year of reform and model its determinants using hazard models. The purpose of these models is to assess the relative importance of interest groups and democracy in speeding up or slowing down competition policy reform. 37 My index of competition policy differs from Voigt's in several important ways. Voigt develops four indicators of competition policy to test its effect on total factor productivity. A strength of his measures is that they incorporate extensive details on the content of the law, the extent to which the law relies on economic reasoning, and the independence of the competition authority. The indicators are based on questionnaires completed by competition authorities and cover 92 countries. My index, while capturing less detail on the economic content and institutional features of the law, provides an easily replicable measure of governments' commitments to competition policy in over 150 developing countries. Another strength of my index is that it incorporates variables measuring governments' commitments to the de facto enforcement of competition policy, including novel data on agency staffing and budgets. 38 The online appendix is available on the author's website http://faculty.msb.edu/sw439/. To examine the influence of the insider interest group on competition policy institutions, I
create the variable Rent-Preserving Alliance to capture variation in the political weight of economic insiders across a large sample of countries. It represents the sum of the standardized values of two independent, theoretically motivated components. 40 The first is an objective index measuring the degree to which labor market rigidities facilitate labor's ability to extract a portion of incumbent firms' rents. The data are are from the World Bank's Doing Business Project, which used to measure the flexibility of labor market institutions around the world. In particular, I use the 2004 39 Agency budget and staff are adjusted by GDP per capita and population, respectively. For further details, see Table 1 and the description of the index in the online appendix. 40 The values are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. To examine the hypothesis that democracy improves commitments to competition policy, I
include the combined Freedom House-Polity index. 43 I expect that the adoption of competition agencies will speed up with democracy, and that democracy will be associated with stronger commitments to the agency.
I control for variables related to the strength of the interest group as well as the country's size and overall regulatory quality. 44 The variable GDP per capita captures economic development, Table 2 reports overall summary statistics, and correlation coefficients appear in Table 3 . Table 2 here. 165-176 (2001) . 51 The variable is Housesys, from the DPI. This variable is coded as follows: 1 if the majority of seats is elected using plurality rule; 0.5 if half plurality and half proportional representation; 0 if the majority of seats is elected by proportional representation.
Hazard Models of Competition Policy Reform
This section reports the results of hazard models measuring the impact of interest groups and democracy on the pace of competition policy reforms during the period 1975-2007. The analysis includes up to 135 countries, of which 63 passed competition laws during the period.
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Hazard models are used to estimate the hazard rate h 0 (t), or the probability that a government in a particular country will pass legislation establishing a competition agency in year t, given that it has not done so in the previous year. A nice feature of hazard models is that they do not exclude countries that do not pass competition legislation by the end of the period. Countries are observed from the beginning of the sample period (1975) through the year they pass legislation, or to the end of the study period (2007) 
This implies that the proportional hazard model is specified as:
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The model produces estimates of δ, which have a standard interpretation: exp(δ i ) is the hazard ratio for the ith coefficient, or the proportional increase in the hazard rate corresponding to a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable x i .
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The model allows for monotonic changes in the underlying hazard over time, determined by the evolutionary parameter α. For example, when α=1, the hazard is constant; for values of α>1, the hazard is increasing; for α<1, the hazard is decreasing. The Weibull specification produces an estimate of the evolutionary parameter α, which provides useful information about the effects of diffusion on a country's propensity to reform the competition regime. Positive and significant values of α can be interpreted as evidence of external influence or policy diffusion. Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from the hazard models of competition policy reform.
In Column 1, I introduce the variable Rent-Preserving Alliance. The negative coefficient corresponding to this variable is statistically significant, and its magnitude is quite large. The Table 4 . Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the estimated coefficient indicates that democracy speeds up competition policy reforms. In particular, a one-standarddeviation increase in democracy increases the hazard rate by 46%; the coefficient is significant at 53 I also probe the robustness of the results to a Cox proportional hazards model. All of the main results are robust to this alternative specification.
the 99% level of confidence. This result implies that democracy increases the probability of early competition policy reform.
I test Hypotheses 1 and 2 simultaneously in Column 3. The variables Rent-Preserving Alliance
and Democracy retain strong statistical significance. The results also suggest that larger countries reform faster, and that trade openness is weakly associated with earlier reform.
The models reported in Columns 4-8 of Table 4 probe the robustness of the findings. Since competition policy reform and the strength of interest groups may be endogenous to the overall quality of the institutional and regulatory environment, I include variables measuring governance (Column 4) and regulatory quality (Column 5). In both cases, Rent-Preserving Alliance and
Democracy retain statistical significance.
I attempt to account for alternative political explanations in Columns 6 and 7. Column 6 investigates the hypothesis that partisanship influences reform by introducing dummy indicators recording the partisan orientation of the executive. 54 Column 7 includes an indicator of plurality electoral systems, which enters negative and weakly significant. I note that the sample size is sharply reduced in both cases, and so the results should be interpreted with caution. However, in each case, the estimates are consistent with my interest group hypothesis. I note that democracy loses statistical significance, likely due to the fact that the reduced sub-sample largely excludes non-democracies.
Finally, Column 8 probes the robustness of Hypothesis 1 using an alternative proxy for the rent-preserving alliance. While it is permissible to include time-invariant covariates in the hazard model, I wanted to test the robustness of the results to a proxy for interest groups that varies on a yearly basis. The model approximates the probability of the passage of competition reform, Table 4 here.
Political Correlates of Competition Policy Commitment
This section reports the results of models estimating the political determinants of governments' commitments to the effectiveness of competition policy reforms. I estimate variations of the following model:
55 With a time variant interest group variable, endogeneity (or simultaneity) bias occurs if the strength of the interest group in year n is affected by the lack of law in year n (but not in previous years), and so on for each year. That is, the effects of the passage of a competition law on interest group strength would need to be almost immediate (within the current year), which is perhaps unlikely. 56 Value added is defined as the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Data from the World Development Indicators. 57 The correlation coefficient is -0.37, significant at the 1% level. The results reported in Table 5 support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Column 1 introduces RentPreserving Alliance, which enters negative and significant at the 95% level of confidence. The results are consistent when I substitute the (negative) proxy for insiders, Manufacturing Value Added, in Column 2. While the estimates are correlational and should not be interpreted as causal, the findings are consistent with the theoretical proposition that organized business and affiliated labor help explain variation in governments' commitments to competition policy. Furthermore, the results reported in Column 3 support the hypothesis that democracy favors the policy interests of outsiders. Consistent with the theory, democracy is strongly positively associated with commitments to competition policy in developing countries. In Column 4, both of the main independent variables retain statistical significance.
Several of the control variables are consistently associated with Agency Commitment. I find that regulatory commitments are stronger in richer, more populous countries. I also find evidence that foreign aid is associated with stronger competition policy. Trade openness, however, is not robustly correlated with Agency Commitment, a result which suggests that there is no clear relationship between external and internal competition policies.
I am interested in whether the impact of insiders depends in part on the level of democracy.
Thus, I estimate the marginal effect of Rent-Preserving Alliance at different levels of democracy. Table 5 here.
I examine the robustness of the findings to alternative explanations and report the results in Table 6 . Column 1 includes measures of political partisanship; Column 2 accounts for the hypothesis that majoritarian electoral systems contribute to improved competition policy 58 Approximately 48% of the sample has democracy scores greater than the midpoint.
outcomes. Neither of these variables is robustly correlated with commitments to competition policy. I find that democracy loses statistical significance in the reduced sample in Column 1, but both of the main hypotheses find support in Column 2. Table 6 here.
Columns 3-6 of Table 6 further attempt to address the potential endogeneity of insiders and democracy by controlling for two measures of institutional heterogeneity: Governance Quality and Regulatory Quality. Absent a plausible instrumental variable to capture exogenous sources of interest group variation, these variables help to alleviate concerns that the political determinants of competition policy may be associated with fundamental institutional reforms of governance and regulation. Specifically, these institutional variables capture additional sources of interest group heterogeneity that may be correlated with the propensity to implement effective competition policy.
The main results are robust to these controls. In Columns 3 and 4, I find that Rent-Preserving Alliance and Democracy retain strong statistical significance; in Columns 5 and 6, I note that the estimated coefficient corresponding to the interaction term Rent-Preserving Alliance x Democracy is virtually unchanged.
59 Table 7 here.
Finally, I estimate the models of Agency Commitment using OLS and report the results in Table   7 . The main findings are unchanged. To probe the potential impact of outliers, Figure 2 
Conclusion
The recent emergence of competition policy institutions in developing countries provides a unique opportunity to explore the political origins of business regulation across a large sample of countries.
I developed an interest group explanation of competition policy design and enforcement that accounts for intra-class political cleavages over antitrust enforcement. I argued that the policy influence of incumbent producers depends crucially on their organizational capacity and the incorporation of workers into their "rent-preserving" alliance.
Evidence Organization named competition policy an important "new issue" in 1997 and set up a working group to explore its relationship to international trade and investment. Perhaps unsurprising, given the findings reported here, the working group was dismantled in 2004 after it was unable to reach an agreement on a multilateral framework for competition policy. While this paper has been devoted to better understanding the domestic political sources of regulatory "discontinuities," their implications for international economic relations merit further investigation. 
